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Recalibrating Copyright Law?:
A Comment on the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision
in CCH Canadian Limited et al. v. Law Society of Upper
Canada
By Teresa Scassa†
strained by the wording of the legislation, and the cri-
teria outlined by the Court raise as many questions as
they resolve. The standard set for originality developedhe Supreme Court of Canada’s unanimous decision
by the Supreme Court is one that fits more easily withT in CCH Canadian Ltd. et. al. v. Law Society of
utilitarian works than it does with traditional copyrightUpper Canada1 marks a second recent decision by the
works, raising new questions about core issues in copy-Court that has major implications for the development
right law. In addition, the direction taken by the Courtof copyright law in Canada. In Théberge v. Galerie D’Art
would appear to run counter to current reforms beingdu Petit Champlain, 2 the majority of the Court provided
contemplated by Parliament in its latest round of copy-a significant articulation of the balance to be struck
right revision. 6 While this may have the salutary effect ofbetween the rights of creators and the rights of users of
providing a users’ rights check on the pro-creator legisla-copyright-protected works. In doing so, it embraced an
tive initiatives, it may also mean that the impact of theapproach to copyright typical of U.S. copyright law in its
decision will be blunted by legislative reforms that moreheyday. The unanimous Court in CCH Canadian makes
explicitly narrow the rights of users to access and useit clear that Théberge was not an isolated case; in an area
copyright-protected works.of law where Parliament has been strongly lobbied to
restrict users’ rights, 3 the Court seems poised to take an
interpretive approach that places limits on the scope of
the rights of owners of copyright. In CCH Canadian, the Facts 
Court does this on a number of fronts. The decision sets he CCH Canadian case emerged from a concerteda new standard for originality in Canadian copyright law, T effort by Canadian law book publishers to crackreigns in the scope of certain acts of infringement in the down on what they perceived to be copyright infringingtechnological context, and signals an open and expansive activities arising from the document delivery services ofapproach to interpreting the fair dealing defences. the Great Library of the Law Society of Upper Canada
The impact of CCH Canadian is likely to be far- (LSUC), as well as from the provision of free-standing
ranging. For creators of so-called ‘‘utilitarian works’’, 4 the photocopy machines in the library. The publishers
standard of originality set by the Court will have ramifi- argued that their products, which included edited rea-
cations for the scope of protection available for these sons for judgment, head notes, case summaries, topical
works. Individual and institutional users of works are indices and treatises, were protected by copyright, and
given broader latitude to make use of the works without that the LSUC, by not complying with the rules set out
payment to the creators. The implications of the decision in section 30.2 of the Copyright Act, 7 by not strictly
may be particularly important for those who assist users monitoring fair dealing by its patrons, and by providing
in accessing works; such as libraries, schools and other free-standing photocopiers with insufficient warnings
public institutions. The decision may also have broader regarding copyright infringement, was without an
implications, as the trends it signals are relied upon in acceptable defence for the infringing acts. The LSUC’s
the larger context of interpreting the provisions of the response to these claims was wide-ranging. It challenged
legislation in an ever-changing digital environment. 5 the subsistence of copyright in many of the publishers’
Yet for all of the issues that CCH Canadian works, it argued that it was not liable for authorizing
addresses and seeks to resolve, further areas of uncer- infringement, that its patrons were not infringing, and
tainty remain. The approach that the courts may take to that any infringing copying activities would fall within
interpreting fair dealing remains substantially con- the scope of the fair dealing defence.































































90 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
The issues in the case had received a mixed recep- McLachlin C.J. made relatively short work of the
tion in the courts below. At trial, Gibson J. found that the long controversy over the standard for originality in
bulk of the publishers’ works at issue in the case failed to Canadian copyright law. She identified ‘‘sweat of the
meet the threshold for originality. 8 The Court of Appeal brow’’ as occupying one end of an originality con-
reversed on this point, finding originality in the pub- tinuum, and the U.S. ‘‘creativity’’ requirement as occu-
lishers’ works and finding the library liable for author- pying the other. In typical Canadian fashion, she took
izing copyright infringement through the provision of the view that ‘‘the correct position falls between these
free-standing photocopiers for its patrons. 9 The Great extremes.’’ 21 More specifically, she identified that origi-
Library was also found liable for infringing copyright via nality in Canadian copyright law required first that the
its document delivery service to patrons of the library. 10 work ‘‘must be more than a mere copy of another
In contrast to the trial decision, the Supreme Court of work.’’ 22 Beyond that, while it need not be creative ‘‘in
Canada found that copyright subsisted in most of the the sense of being novel or unique’’, 23 it must reflect ‘‘an
works of the publishers, found the LSUC was not liable exercise of skill and judgment’’, 24 which in turn incorpo-
for authorizing infringement, and expanded the scope of rates some form of ‘‘intellectual effort’’. 25
the fair dealing defence. In McLachlin C.J.’s view, the ‘‘sweat of the brow’’
standard adopted in the U.K. and Australia is inconsis-
tent with the original Berne Convention, 26 and with the
Originality approach of continental civilian jurisdictions. It is also, in
her view, inconsistent with the purpose of Canadianerhaps the most anticipated part of the Supreme
copyright law in that to reward industriousness aloneP Court of Canada’s decision in CCH Canadian was
would disrupt the balance between the rights and inter-that which tackled the issue of the standard for origi-
ests of creators and those of society more generally. 27nality in Canadian copyright law. This issue had been
More specifically, she identified the interest of society ‘‘inthe topic of much debate in recent years, ever since the
maintaining a robust public domain that could helpU.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Feist Publica-
foster future creative innovation.’’ 28 A requirement oftions Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co. Inc. 11 In that
‘‘skill and judgment’’ as a prerequisite to copyrightcase, the U.S. Supreme Court bluntly rejected ‘‘sweat of
would, in her view, provide ‘‘room for the public domainthe brow’’ as a basis for finding the requisite originality
to flourish as others are able to produce new works byin a work for the purposes of copyright protection. The
building on the ideas and information contained in theU.S. Court ruled that copyright could only subsist in an
works of others.’’ 29 In this regard, she embraced the posi-original selection or arrangement of data, and that origi-
tion of O’Connor J. in Feist that there is no copyright innality in that selection or arrangement would require a
facts. 30 In the end result, McLachlin C.J. affirmed that an‘‘creative spark’’ 12 or some ‘‘minimal level of creativity’’. 13
original work must originate from the author and ‘‘beA few years later, in Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v.
the product of the exercise of skill and judgment that isAmerican Business Information Inc., 14 the Canadian Fed-
more than trivial’’. 31 Applying this standard to the facts oferal Court of Appeal ruled, on a somewhat similar set of
the case, she found all of the works in question to befacts to those in Feist, that there was likewise a require-
original.ment of some minimal amount of ‘‘creativity’’ for a
finding of originality in Canadian copyright law.15 The Although the Court in CCH Canadian is unequiv-
Canadian decision in Tele-Direct left much uncertainty ocal about the new standard for originality in Canadian
and debate as to the appropriate test for originality in copyright law, the standard chosen by the Court leaves
Canadian law.16 By the time the Federal Court of Appeal room for its own interpretive issues. The standard set by
heard the appeal in CCH Canadian, it was ready to the U.S. Supreme Court in Feist has been referred to by
distance itself from Decary J.A.’s references to ‘‘creativity’’ the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of
in Tele-Direct. 17 The majority of the Court took the view Canada as that of ‘‘creativity’’, 32 although in reality, the
that ‘‘creativity’’ set the threshold for originality too high. U.S. Supreme Court required only a ‘‘spark’’ or a ‘‘mod-
Instead, they extracted from Tele-Direct, and adopted in icum’’ of creativity. In rejecting this standard, McLachlin
their own reasons the formula of ‘‘skill, judgment and C.J.’s critique of the U.S. standard is not that it is too
labour’’, 18 which was a grammatically questionable ambiguous or difficult to interpret on a case-by-case
rephrasing of an earlier standard of ‘‘skill, judgment or basis; 33 rather, her critique appears to be that it sets too
labour’’. 19 This did little to resolve the controversy over high a threshold for originality. In her view, the Cana-
originality. The Australian Federal Court’s decision in dian standard of ‘‘skill and judgment’’ requires some-
Telstra Corporation Ltd. v. Desktop Marketing Systems thing less than a ‘‘modicum’’ or ‘‘spark’’ of creativity. She
Pty Ltd. 20 gave hope to those who advocated a pure argued: ‘‘A creativity standard implies that something
‘‘sweat of the brow’’ standard of originality in Canada, must be novel or non-obvious — concepts more prop-
while others argued that ‘‘skill, judgment and labour’’ erly associated with patent law than copyright law.’’ 34 Yet






























































A Comment on the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in CCH Canadian Limited et al. v. Law Society of Upper Canada 91
standard of ‘‘creativity’’ simpliciter, it is much less true of Although McLachlin C.J. is careful to note that ‘‘creative
a standard that requires only a ‘‘minimal level’’ or ‘‘spark’’ works will by definition be ‘original’ and covered by
of creativity. In practical terms, a ‘‘spark’’ of creativity copyright’’, 39 this ultimately does little more than con-
may be very little indeed. firm that creativity reflects an exercise of skill and judg-
ment. Any other reading would lead to the conclusionThe Canadian Court’s newly minted standard of that works of a certain kind are inherently ‘‘creative’’, andoriginality is not obviously less exacting than the U.S. therefore protectable by copyright.standard, nor is it any less ambiguous. In elaborating on
the standard of ‘‘skill and judgment’’, McLachlin C.J. The ‘‘skill and judgment’’ standard may put into
stated that the ‘‘exercise of skill and judgment required question copyright in a range of works on the basis of
to produce the work must not be so trivial that it could fairly subjective considerations. For example, while a
be characterized as a purely mechanical exercise.’’ 36 It is photograph taken by a professional photographer would
difficult to see how the assessment of a non-trivial exer- be considered as original under the CCH Canadian stan-
cise of skill and judgment is any less subjective than the dard because its composition reflects ‘‘skill and judg-
assessment of a ‘‘spark’’ of creativity. Further, it is difficult ment’’ on the part of the photographer, it is less clear
to see how, in terms of practical effect, a non-trivial exer- whether a family snapshot, taken by a parent too busy to
cise of skill and judgment will amount to anything other finish reading the manual on how to operate the camera,
than a ‘‘spark’’ of creativity. While it is possible to argue reflects any skill and judgment on the part of the
that the different standards might result in different deci- ‘‘author’’ of the photo. A gleeful splashing of paint by a
sions in some cases, the reality is that each is sufficiently small child on canvas reflects very little skill or judgment;
subjective and fluid to result in identical decisions in a the same splashing of paint by a renowned artist will be
wide range of cases. While not wanting to go so far as to presumed to reflect his or her skill and judgment as an
say that the result in any given case will depend on what artist. When seen from the perspective of more tradi-
the judge had for breakfast, this consideration is, in prac- tional copyright works, the U.S. ‘‘modicum’’ or ‘‘spark’’ of
tical terms, likely to be as significant as the difference creativity test eliminates the likelihood of distinctions
between the two standards. being made between more traditional kinds of artistic
works on the basis of subjective assessments of either theIt is arguable that the Canadian standard is more quality of the work or the pedigree of the creator. Theoriented towards utilitarian works than is the U.S. stan- difference between the Canadian and the U.S. standards,dard. Utilitarian works are ones that do not have crea- therefore, is one of perspective. The U.S. standardtivity or artistic expression as a main object; rather, they embraces traditional copyright works while creating con-are works that are primarily functional, such as tele- siderable leeway for utilitarian works. The Canadianphone directories, computer software, or fillable forms. standard embraces a broad range of utilitarian worksIn such a context, assessing the ‘‘intellectual effort’’ in the while raising the spectre of more subjective interpreta-form of skill and judgment that goes into the works tions of copyright in the traditional categories of copy-makes more sense than conceptualizing this effort as a right works.‘‘spark’’ of creativity. It is arguable that the U.S. language
of ‘‘creativity’’, even if what is required is minimal, could The concern about subjective assessments of the
place utilitarian works at a disadvantage in assessing their intellectual effort that goes into a work is not artificial. In
worthiness for copyright protection. 37 By contrast, it considering the works at issue in this case, it is clear that
could be argued that the Canadian standard, by focusing McLachlin C.J.’s inquiry into intellectual effort or skill
on ‘‘skill and judgment’’ or intellectual effort, embraces and judgment includes an assessment of the ‘‘intellectual
the possibility of utilitarian works being protected by pedigree’’ of the creators of the work. In considering the
copyright wherever there is some authorial effort. How- head notes, for example, she refers to the need of the
ever, the reality in the United States is that utilitarian authors to ‘‘use their knowledge about the law and
works have been protected using the Feist standard;38 it developed ability to determine legal ratios to produce
is not clear whether the difference in semantic emphasis the headnotes.’’ 40 In assessing the ‘‘skill and judgment’’
is significant enough to regard the two tests as marking that went into case summaries and topical indices,
different points on an ‘‘originality’’ continuum, as McLachlin C.J. also references the kind of skill and judg-
opposed to the two being differently coloured dots at ment that comes from legal training and expertise in the
more or less the same point in the continuum. subject area.
Although the U.S. standard has been criticized for Interestingly, McLachlin C.J. finds no ‘‘skill and
importing a subjective assessment of creativity into the judgment’’ in the work that goes into editing the judicial
originality analysis, the new Canadian standard is open reasons. She refers to the correction of ‘‘minor grammat-
to criticism for similar reasons, though on the other end ical errors and spelling mistakes’’ 41 as involving skill and
of the issue. The Canadian standard, formulated in CCH judgment that is ‘‘too trivial to warrant copyright protec-
Canadian in the context of utilitarian, rather than more tion.’’ 42 This would presumably imply that the ability to
traditional creative works, emphasizes skill, judgment, revise a work for spelling and grammatical errors






























































92 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
thing that would likely be challenged by anyone with loaded gun.’’ 46 The Court of Appeal faulted the Law
experience in a post-secondary institution. 43 It is wrong Society for its lack of concrete effort to take steps ‘‘to
to say such work does not reflect skill and judgment monitor, to police or to otherwise dissuade its patrons
(unless some forms of skill and judgment are valued from infringing copyright or to ensure that its
above others); it is perhaps more palatable to say that photocopiers were used legitimately.’’ 47
such work lacks a spark of creativity, as the correction of The Supreme Court of Canada reached a differentspelling and grammar generally involves ensuring con- conclusion from both the Federal Court of Appeal andformity with a fairly fixed set of rules. the Australian High Court. The result comes as a sur-
In summary then, the Court’s new standard for orig- prise, since the other decisions reflected emerging and
inality raises as many questions as it resolves. While it existent practices in the university and library sectors in
reflects a positive trend by the Court towards a more both countries. For example, licence agreements with
balanced approach to interpreting the Copyright Act, reprography collectives in Canada have reflected an
and a welcome concern for the public domain, it is understanding that some library photocopying
questionable whether the attempt to be distinctly ‘‘Cana- amounted to infringement, and that libraries could be
dian’’ in our approach to originality has led us to our held legally responsible. 48 McLachlin C.J.’s decision
own distinct set of interpretive problems and issues. briefly canvassed the extensive case law on ‘‘authoriza-
Copyright law has increasingly been stretched to accom- tion’’ to distill some basic principles. She rejected the
modate a growing range of utilitarian works. Interpreta- notion accepted by the Federal Court of Appeal that
tions of the Act or of basic copyright principles such as where a library is aware of the likelihood of infringing
originality should be sensitive to the differences between copying, it will authorize infringement if it fails to take
the more traditional kinds of copyright works and the concrete steps to prevent the illicit copying. Noting that
ever-increasing range of utilitarian works. the case law established the test of authorization as to
‘‘sanction, approve and countenance’’, 49 McLachlin C.J.
insisted that the term ‘‘countenance’’ be given its
strongest possible meaning. She took the view that ‘‘aInfringement by Authorization 
person does not authorize infringement by authorizing
t was argued by the law book publishers that the the mere use of equipment that could be used toI provision of free-standing photocopy machines in the infringe copyright.’’ 50 Further, she noted that ‘‘Courts
Great Library amounted to an authorization of any should presume that a person who authorizes an activity
infringing copying done by patrons of the library. If this does so only so far as it is in accordance with the law.’’ 51
were the case, the LSUC could be held liable for the The presumption is rebuttable if ‘‘a certain relationship
authorization of the infringing acts. The publishers drew or degree of control’’ 52 can be established. While she
support for their argument from the decision of the acknowledged that authorization need not be express,
High Court of Australia in University of New South but can be implied from the facts, she did not find that
Wales v. Moorhouse, 44 which addressed the specific case control of users is required as a positive step to avoid
of library photocopy machines. In Moorhouse, the High infringement through authorization.
Court found that the provision of free-standing photo-
The Supreme Court of Canada specifically rejectedcopy machines by a university library amounted to the
the line of reasoning developed in Moorhouse.authorization of any infringing copying by users of the
McLachlin C.J. took the view that ‘‘the Moorhouselibrary. The Court applied the same standard of ‘‘sanc-
approach to authorization shifts the balance in copyrighttion, approve, countenance’’, but took the view that
too far in favour of the owner’s rights and unnecessarily
. . . a person who has under his control the means by which interferes with the proper use of copyrighted works foran infringement of copyright may be committed — such as
the good of society as a whole.’’ 53 She found no authori-a photocopying machine — and who makes it available to
other persons, knowing, or having reason to suspect, that it zation on the basis of a combination of factors, including
is likely to be used for the purpose of committing an a lack of evidence of actual infringing use of the copiers,
infringement, and omitting to take reasonable steps to limit and the ultimate lack of control that the Great Libraryits use to legitimate purposes, would authorize any infringe-
would have over the actions of its patrons. 54 Noting thatment that resulted from its use. 45
there was no master-servant or other relationshipThe Federal Court of Appeal in CCH Canadian between the Library and its patrons, she found that therecited Moorhouse with approval, and reached the same was no basis for any exercise of control.conclusion as the Australian Court on the issue of
authorization by the Great Library. Because the library The decision on authorization is an important one,
provided the photocopying machines and provided the and one with potentially far-reaching consequences. It is
copyright-protected works all in one convenient loca- made in a context where university and public libraries
tion, and because the machines could be expected to be have struggled under the threat of liability for author-
used for copying these works, Linden J.A. opined that the izing copyright infringement, and where many patrons
LSUC’s acts made it ‘‘as if the Law Society operates a have been, as a consequence, on the receiving end of an
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licences entered into with reprography collectives with a aside for a different case comment, it is sufficient to note
view to eliminating this potential liability. The decision here that the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s
amounts to a significant victory for libraries and library approach to ‘‘authorization’’ in CCH Canadian is far
patrons. ranging.
The decision should also be considered in a broader
context of the debate over the liability of providers of
technology for infringing uses of this technology. 55 Fair Dealing 
While the photocopy and fax machines at issue in CCH
he main issue of fair dealing in this case was raisedCanadian are now on the low-tech end of the spectrum, T in relation to the custom photocopy service of theit is unfortunate that the Court did not provide a set of
Great Library. Under this service, the staff of the Greatreasons that addressed the relationship of technologies of
Library would photocopy materials requested by patronsreproduction and distribution to issues of authorization.
and send the materials to them. The issues here wereInstead, by bluntly identifying control over users as a
twofold: whether the Library could benefit from any fairfactor, McLachlin C.J. severely limits authorization as a
dealing exception that would apply to its patrons, andbasis for copyright liability.
whether the copying of the extracts in the circumstancesThe full significance of the decision in relation to amounted to fair dealing.technologies of reproduction and distribution is more
The copying done by the Great Library as part of itsdifficult to gauge. However, the recent litigation in BMG
document delivery service was performed under theCanada Inc. v. John Doe56 suggests that the implications
Library’s Access to the Law Policy. This policy indicatedmay be far ranging. In that case, which involved, inter
that, in pursuance of the objectives of serving the admin-alia, the issue of whether music downloads over the
istration of justice and the rule of law, the Library wouldInternet infringed copyright, von Finckenstein J. of the
provide ‘‘[s]ingle copies of library materials, required forFederal Court of Canada took the view that those who
the purposes of research, review, private study and criti-uploaded music onto a shared directory available to
cism, as well as use in court, tribunal and governmentothers over the Internet did not authorize copyright
proceedings’’. 58 The policy stipulated that only singleinfringement. Citing the CCH Canadian decision, von
copies would be made, and that the copying would onlyFinckenstein J. stated:
be for specific purposes made explicit by patrons to staffI cannot see a real difference between a library that places a
in advance of the copying. The policy set other parame-photocopy machine in a room full of copyrighted material
ters to copying as well.and a computer user that places a personal copy on a shared
directory linking to a P2P service. In either case the precon- At trial, the Great Library asserted a fair dealingditions to copying and infringement are set up but the
defence of its custom photocopy service on the basis thatelement of authorization is missing. 57
its Access to the Law Policy amounted to fair dealing
There are few differences between the two situa- with copyright-protected works. While the Court of
tions when it comes to the level of control; the person Appeal had accepted that the Law Society could invoke
who stores files on a shared directory does not control the purposes of its patrons in a fair dealing defence, the
the people who access those files, or the purposes for majority of the Court had found insufficient evidence of
which they access the files. On the other hand, uploaders the purposes of the patrons to support the defence. The
are in a significantly different position from a library in a Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to this issue gave
number of ways. First, the rights of uploaders of music to greater scope to the fair dealing defence: according to
reproduce that music into shared directories is subject to McLachlin C.J., not only could the Great Library rely
challenge in a way that the rights of libraries to own or upon the purposes of its patrons to establish the defence,
provide the contents of the libraries to users is not. The it was entitled to rely upon its general practices rather
rights of users of libraries to access those works is than upon specific evidence of usage by individual
unquestioned, and they can make any number of uses of patrons. In the words of McLachlin C.J.:
the works that do not infringe copyright in the work, ‘‘Dealing’’ connotes not individual acts, but a practice or
from reading, borrowing, and browsing, to copying in system. This comports with the purpose of the fair dealing
amounts and for purposes that are considered fair exception, which is to ensure that users are not unduly
restricted in their ability to use and disseminate copyrighteddealing. The rights of individuals to make use of music
works. Persons or institutions relying on the s. 29 fairfrom the Internet are not as broad, and are constrained
dealing exception need only prove that their own dealingsby the terms of the private copying exception, and by with copyrighted works were for the purpose of research
geography and national borders. It is also much less and private study and were fair. They may do this either by
likely that any significant amount of copying of music showing that their own practices and policies were research-
based and fair, or by showing that all individual dealingsfrom the Internet would qualify as fair dealing under the
with the materials were in fact research-based and fair. 59Act. Another key difference, of course, is between tech-
nology for reproduction and technology that intrinsically It would seem that if the ‘‘big picture’’ policy is
links both reproduction and distribution, two acts that relied upon, the level of actual compliance with the
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the Court should prove extremely encouraging to ular dealing is fair; rather, it is a precondition for the
libraries and universities which attempt, through docu- existence of the defence. In order to qualify as fair
ment delivery services, to provide materials to patrons in dealing, the use made of the work must fall within one
keeping with fair dealing principles, but which lack the of the specified categories of use as outlined in sec-
means or resources to be certain that each individual tions 29, 29.1 and 29.2. 71
request complies with the requirements of fair dealing. ‘‘Purpose of the dealing’’ is thus best left off a set of
The Court’s decision in relation to the actual inter- criteria for assessing fair dealing, as it is already specifi-
pretation of the fair dealing defence is also welcome, cally addressed in the legislation. To leave it as a criterion
given that this has been a relatively under-litigated area suggests that ‘‘purpose of the dealing’’ has a meaning that
of copyright law. The structure of the defence in the goes beyond the purposes required by the Act. This is, in
legislation may be largely to blame; by framing the fact, what occured in CCH Canadian: In this regard,
defence narrowly, it invites a more restrictive approach McLachlin C.J. indicated that some allowable purposes
to interpretation. 60 Perhaps surprisingly, in this context, may be considered more or less fairer than others,
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada breathes depending upon the context. Thus, she suggested that
significant life into the defence, beginning with ‘‘research done for commercial purposes may not be as
McLachlin C.J.’s statement that ‘‘[i]n order to maintain fair as research done for charitable purposes’’. 72 With
the proper balance between the rights of a copyright respect, this is a troubling distinction, and one that
owner and users’ interests, [fair dealing] must not be appears to contradict earlier statements regarding the
interpreted restrictively.’’ 61 defence. In the statutory defence for ‘‘research or private
In order to qualify as fair dealing, a use of a work study’’, the term research is not qualified, and McLachlin
must fall within one of the three statutory provisions C.J. herself urges that the defence be given a large and
that establish the defence. 62 This means that the use of liberal interpretation so as to preserve the balance
the work must be for research or private study, 63 criti- between the interests of copyright owners and society
cism or comment, 64 or news reporting. 65 In CCH Cana- generally. Much research is conducted for somebody’s
dian, it was the use of the works for ‘‘research or private profit, as is, for example, research by lawyers for their
study’’ that was at issue. McLachlin C.J. mandated a clients. There is no sensible reason why the nature of
‘‘ large and liberal interpretation ’’ 66 of the term one’s clients or profit motives should limit one’s access to
‘‘research’’. As such, the defence would not be limited to the defence. It might be reasonable, in some circum-
private or non-commercial forms of research. Research stances to find that uses for certain commercial purposes
for the purpose of serving clients in a legal practice do not amount to fair dealing where, for example, the
would certainly fall within the scope of the defence, research is used to create a product in competition with
notwithstanding the fact that such research is carried out the original, but these considerations can be dealt with
for profit. 67 The determination of what amount of under other criteria in the list.
dealing is ‘‘fair’’ is one that must be made on the facts of
The second consideration is the ‘‘character’’ of thea given case. McLachlin C.J. approved of and adopted the
dealing. This allows a court to consider the way in whichset of six criteria outlined by Linden J.A. in the Federal
the works were used. McLachlin C.J. gave the example ofCourt of Appeal decision in the case. The factors are
multiple copies of a work being widely distributed, anddrawn in part from a decision by Lord Denning in Hub-
suggests that this kind of dealing would likely be unfairbard v. Vosper, 68 and in part from the statutory criteria
as compared with the use of a single copy for a specificfor assessing fair use in the U.S. The factors are:
purpose. 73 She also noted that the particular practice in
(1) the purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the any given industry as to how works are customarily dealtdealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives to the
with may be useful in assessing fairness. However, thisdealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the
latter consideration has the potential to be problematic.dealing on the work. 69
If an industry or even a group of users has developed aThe factors are accompanied by the usual caveats:
series of practices out of fear that the traditionally narrowthat they may not all be present in any given case, that
fair dealing defences might not be available to them, theno one factor is determinative, and that other factors
weight of this practice under the more expansivelymight also be relevant, depending upon the particular set
defined approach by the Supreme Court of Canadaof facts. 70
would have the effect of constricting the scope of theIt is odd that in a case where the Court struggled to available defence. Given the spotty history of the fairdevelop a uniquely Canadian standard for originality, it dealing defence, a reliance on past practices to interpretwas so quick to graft what are essentially the American the actual scope of the users’ rights may be problematic.fair use criteria onto a very different sort of defence
under Canadian copyright law. While the criteria may The third criterion identified by the Court is the
be useful as analytical tools, they could well have been amount of the work. McLachlin C.J. indicated that
better crafted to the particular context of fair dealing ‘‘[b]oth the amount of the dealing and the importance of
under Canadian law. For example, ‘‘the purpose of the the work allegedly infringed should be considered’’. 74
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surely be a misstatement; such qualitative judgments that the Great Library can fairly provide a document
about the worth of the underlying work should be delivery service to those unable to travel to the library to
avoided. Instead it might well have been intended to be do legal research if one is willing to accept that a real
an instruction to consider the importance of the extract alternative existed in the form of an online subscription
from the work in assessing fair dealing. McLachlin C.J. service. The fact that this is a paid service is likely offset
reiterates the common caveat that insubstantial or trivial by the fact that the research is being conducted for profit
taking from a work is not infringement, and so does not in most cases. While this raises interesting access to jus-
need to be considered under a fair dealing analysis. 75 She tice and public policy issues, the fact is that neither the
indicates as well that it is possible for the copying of an existence of these alternatives nor the public policy issues
entire work to be fair, depending on the purpose. 76 Thus, are considered by the Court. To be meaningful, fair
it might be fair dealing to copy an entire journal article dealing with a work should be fair dealing with a work
for the purpose of research, but not to copy the entirety regardless of whether other commercial options existed
of another work in a different context. by which a user could have paid for the same extract
from the work. The introduction by the Supreme CourtUnder ‘‘alternatives to the dealing’’ McLachlin C.J. of Canada of the criterion of ‘‘alternatives to the work’’suggests that where there is ‘‘ a non-copyrighted leaves open the possibility that future courts will makeequivalent of a work that could have been used instead much of pay-per-use models in an assessment of fairof the copyrighted work, this should be considered by dealing in a variety of contexts. The reality is that digi-the court.’’ 77 In her more specific analysis of the facts of tization makes possible the marketing of works in athe case, she also appears to consider whether there was variety of formats, and according to a variety of businessan alternative to the custom photocopy service provided models. The impact of these changing practices on a fairby the Great Library. She notes, for example, that it dealing analysis should not be significant according towould not be reasonable to expect all patrons of the the broad principles laid out by the Court, but may endservice to do their research on site at the Great Library, up being significant by virtue of the structure and criteriaas so many of them lived outside a reasonable geo- for analysis set out in the same decision.graphic radius of the library. 78
The point seems to be partially addressed whenThe consideration of such alternatives in a fair McLachlin C.J. makes one clarification of the issue ofdealing analysis is also problematic. It is not clear, for alternatives in the defence of fair dealing which is likelyexample, on these reasons, whether the existence of a to be of great importance to libraries and universities infree online source for court decisions, such as CanLii 79 or particular. She states that the ‘‘availability of a licence iscourt Web sites, would mean that the delivery of a copy not relevant to deciding whether a dealing has beenof a court decision from a case reporter, complete with fair.’’ 82 In other words, the fact that a photocopy licenceheadnote and case summary, could not constitute fair was available to the Great Library through a collectivedealing, since an alternative existed to the researcher that society, but was not obtained, does not have any bearingwould not infringe the copyright of the publisher. In on the assessment of whether there was fair dealing. Thetheory, this should not matter: the issue with fair dealing Court notes thatreally should be whether a particular use of a work
If a copyright owner were allowed to license people to useamounted to fair dealing; the analysis should not
its work and then point to a person’s decision not to obtaindegrade into whether the user considered or pursued
a licence as proof that his or her dealings were not fair, thisother avenues to acquire the work. 80 In a similar vein, it would extend the scope of the owner’s monopoly over the
is not clear why the photocopying of an article for use of his or her work in a manner that would not be
research or private study by someone who lives next consistent with the Copyright Act’s balance between
owner’s rights and user’s interests. 83door to a library should be evaluated differently from the
same act by someone who lives at greater remoteness This is an extremely important statement forfrom the library. The fair dealing analysis cannot become libraries and universities, which have struggled with thebogged down by this level of detail about the user, the costs of reprography licences to protect them againstwork used, competing works, and other ways in which copyright infringement actions. Interestingly enough, thethe user might have accessed or used the work. The issue Copyright Act suggests that Parliament might take a dif-of the ‘‘non-copyright equivalent’’ of a work raises even ferent view on this point. Section 30.3 exempts educa-more potential problems: what is an ‘‘equivalent’’ to a tional institutions, libraries, archives, and museums fromparticular work, such that copying the work could cease copyright infringement in the provision of free-standingto be fair dealing because of the existence of the unpro- photocopiers if, inter alia, the institution has entered intotected ‘‘equivalent’’? 81 an agreement with a collective society. Quite apart from
In a related consideration, it is not clear how the fact the fact that the Court’s decision on authorization has
that the publishers provide many of their major works undermined any basis for the liability of a library,
through online subscription services that can be museum, or archive in the provision of free-standing
remotely accessed should be factored in under this crite- photocopy machines, the Court’s position emphasizes
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any other exemptions that might be available in the least, it also further aligns Canadian copyright law with
Act. 84 U.S. law. In this regard, the new ‘‘purpose’’ of Canadian
copyright law is worthy of some analysis.The fifth criterion, the nature of the work, allows
courts to consider such things as whether the work is McLachlin C.J. adopted the statement of the pur-
published or unpublished, confidential, and so on. In pose of copyright law in Canada that was put forth by a
applying this criterion to the facts, the Court also majority of the Court in Théberge, and later reiterated in
assessed the nature of the work in terms of its particular Desputeaux v. Chouette. 85 Without a doubt now, the
purpose and audience. Because the works at issue in proper approach to interpreting copyright law in Canada
CCH Canadian were court decisions and other legal is to take an approach that balances ‘‘promoting the
research documents, the Court emphasized the public public interest in the encouragement and dissemination
interest in having unimpeded access to these works. The of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just
public interest in access to these works is an important reward for the creator.’’ 86 This approach is one that is
factor for the Court throughout the decision, a fact that prepared to recognize limitations to creators’ rights.
is not surprising given the Court’s own involvement in While in Théberge, this interpretive approach involved
and commitment to the fair administration of justice in the majority in giving a more limited scope to the right
Canada. The question for more general-purpose libraries of reproduction, the issue in CCH Canadian turned on
is to determine the extent to which the nature of the the interpretation of ‘‘originality’’ as a line between copy-
works at issue was a deciding factor in the fair dealing right protection and the public domain, and the inter-
analysis. pretation of the rights of users under the fair dealing
Finally, in any fair dealing analysis, courts are to defences.
consider the effect of the dealing on the work. Where a
The balancing approach articulated by the Supremework is reproduced so that the reproduction will com-
Court in Théberge, and reiterated in subsequent recentpete in the marketplace with the original, a finding of
decisions marks an important judicial statement of thefair dealing is less likely. The Court also considered
purpose of Canadian copyright law. While some havewhether the market for the publisher’s works was
argued that this was the underlying purpose in theaffected by the copying done through the document
past, 87 judicial interpretations have not consistentlydelivery service of the Great Library. The Court noted
reflected this purpose, and in fact, some have overtlythat no such evidence was introduced by the publishers.
taken a more narrow approach to the interpretation of
It is refreshing to have a view from the Supreme copyright legislation. 88 In this context, the importance of
Court of Canada on the proper interpretation of the fair the approach of the Court should not be underesti-
dealing defences contained in the Copyright Act. The mated; it sends a clear message to other courts as to how
Court provides an important statement that the defences the legislation should be interpreted. This message has
should be interpreted with a view to the overall purpose not been lost. In BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, 89 von
of the legislation first articulated by the Court in Finckenstein J. of the Federal Court Trial Division ruled
Théberge. This alone suggests a more expansive that Internet music file-sharing did not amount to copy-
approach to the defence that has been seen up to this right infringement. Although he referred to relatively
point in Canadian case law on fair dealing. The Court little authority to support this view, the Supreme Court’s
has also given its blessing to a set of criteria that allow for new direction was clearly an influencing factor. 90
a more flexible, context-specific analysis of fair dealing
The Canadian Supreme Court’s statement of pur-on a case-by-case basis. While this kind of guidance is
pose is largely drawn from both the U.S. Constitution,welcome, the Court has offered some vague pronounce-
and U.S. case law that follows it. In the U.S. Constitution,ments and generalities regarding these criteria that may
Congress is granted jurisdiction over copyright law in thelead to some potentially disturbing results in future
following terms: it may legislate ‘‘to Promote the Pro-cases. To the extent that these criteria are drawn largely
gress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limitedfrom the U.S. ‘‘fair use’’ criteria, it is also reasonable to
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right toconsider the extent that U.S. fair use case law can now be
their respective Writings and Discoveries.’’ 91 U.S. copy-referenced in constructing a fair dealing argument.
right case law has been consistently more favourable to
users’ rights, in part because of judicial attitudes condi-
tioned by the statement of purpose, and in part becausePurpose of Canadian Copyright
of the more generous rights given to users in the U.S.Law: A Balancing of Interests Copyright Act. 92 This is in part reflective of the fact that
s noted above, the Court’s statement of the purpose the U.S. statement of the purpose of copyright law isA of copyright informs its approach to issues of origi- embedded in the Constitution, and thus serves as a
nality, authorization, and fair dealing in this case. The guide to both Congress and the courts. 93 By contrast,
statement of purpose is interesting for a number of rea- Parliament receives no comparable constitutional direc-
sons. It cements a very recent shift in approach to copy- tion in its approach to copyright monopolies. The
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mately only directs courts as to how they should inter- also employees, whose day-to-day compensation has
pret the provisions of the legislation; it has no effect on little direct or immediate correlation with the success or
Parliament’s policy-making function. It is also question- failure of a particular ‘‘work’’ (as, for example, in the
able whether the Court’s direction would survive an software industry). There are creators of entire works,
explicit restatement of the purpose of copyright by Par- and value-added creators (such as publishers), there are
liament. creators of utilitarian works (such as directories or other
fact-based works) and there are creators of more tradi-The new approach signaled by the Court comes at a
tional types of works. In the digital and informationtime when there are many indications within the United
society, copyright has come to be the main vehicle forStates that there is a legislative will to reduce the public
protecting a wide range of works that can be calleddomain and to produce legislation that is often signifi-
‘‘utilitarian works’’ or ‘‘information products’’. With acantly more restrictive of users’ rights. Notable examples
one-size fits all statute, and with the commercial sectorinclude the enactment of the Digital Millenium Copy-
having much deeper pockets to support litigation, theright Act, 94 and the extension of the term of protection
interpretation of copyright law has been significantlyfor copyright law in the 1998 Copyright Term Extension
influenced by disputes arising with respect to utilitarianAct. 95 In addition, the recent United States’ Supreme
works and information products.Court ruling in Eldred v. Ashcroft96 makes it clear that in
The diversity in the interests of ‘‘creators ’’ isthe view of the majority of that Court, the courts should
matched by the diversity of interests as between ‘‘users’’defer to the means chosen by the legislature to achieve
and ‘‘society’’. The two terms are sometimes used tothe balance of rights. 97 In Canada, we are left with a
mean the same thing (what is good for users is good forsituation where Parliament is not bound by the Consti-
society), but the interests are not necessarily aligned. Fortution to achieve any particular balance, but where the
example, if society would benefit economically from aCourts have adopted the view that copyright law serves
strongly competitive digital economy, then the intereststo achieve a balance between the rights of users and
of society might be best served by a very robust copy-creators of works. The situation is, if anything, more
right system that strongly favours the rights of owners oftenuous than that in the United States. In any event, the
copyright. 105 To the extent that knowledge and informa-new Canadian orientation may be too little, too late in
tion generation becomes more commercialized (eventhe larger scheme of where copyright law is heading.
within the university context), arguments that a robustThis is in part because the development of copyright
protection of the rights of owners of copyright betterpolicy in Canada is significantly constrained by Canada’s
serves the public interest gain strength. This is because,international obligations under treaties such as the Berne
the argument goes, being able to profit from knowledgeConvention98 and, most recently WIPO’s Copyright
generation and dissemination ensures that such invest-Treaty99 and WIPO’s Performances and Phonograms
ments will continue to be made in such knowledgeTreaty, 100 as well as its international trade obligations
generation and dissemination.under treaties such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement101 and the TRIPS agreement. 102 In its most The point to be made here is that while the Cana-
recent report on copyright reform, the federal govern- dian Supreme Court’s new balancing approach offers
ment has signaled an intention to crack down on music users greater scope under the existing copyright legisla-
downloading, and to implement the WCT, which con- tion than they have ever realistically been able to hope
tains provisions that have the potential to further limit for, it is an approach that may be anachronistic, insuffi-
rights of fair dealing and open access to works. 103 cient, and ultimately against the grain of current legisla-
tive and international directions. 106 The Court may wellThe traditional ‘‘balancing’’ approach between the
be situating itself as the last champion of a muchrights of users and the rights of creators belongs, in some
beleagured underdog — the ordinary user, and in thisrespects, to a simpler era. The interests to be balanced
respect, the effort is welcome.today are so complex and multi-faceted, that it is overly
simplistic to speak of ‘‘creators’’ on the one hand and
‘‘users’’ or even ‘‘society’’ on the other. The interests of
the actual ‘‘creators’’ of works may be very limited in the Conclusion context of industries where it is typical for commercial
enterprises such as publishers or record companies to he decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
seek a full assignment of copyright in a work. In such T CCH Canadian is one of the most significant copy-
circumstances, ‘‘creators’’ rapidly take a back seat to right decisions made by that Court in recent times. In a
‘‘owners’’ of copyright. Ironically, in some cases dealing single decision, the Court has confirmed and consoli-
with new and emergent technologies, the interests of dated its new interpretive approach to copyright law,
owners of copyright may ultimately be served by deci- provided a new standard of originality in copyright,
sions which, by not expanding or extending their rights, updated the law on authorization in relation to those
force them to adopt new business models. 104 Further, who provide both the means and content for copying,
there are many different types of creators: there are art- and set new, expansive parameters to the fair dealing
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supportive of users’ rights, and which may be of great arrived at in Canadian copyright history, seems ironically
significance to major publicly funded users of copyright at odds with the new directions for copyright law reform
works such as libraries, schools, and archives. At the same proposed by the current federal government in its most
time, by dealing with so many major issues in such a recent policy paper on copyright reform.107 Given the
relatively brief and sparsely reasoned decision, the Court political realities of copyright policy and the legislative
has raised new questions and created new problems for level, the approach of the Court gives some hope that
future courts to tackle. users, however drastically they see their rights con-
strained by Parliament, may have some room for opti-The message from the Court in recent decisions
mism in a more generous interpretive approach by thesuch as Théberge and CCH Canadian, which recalibrate
courts.the rights of users and creators of works into something
much more balanced than the courts or legislatures have
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97 Ibid. See: Minister of Industry, Supporting Culture and Innovation: Report on
the Provisions and Operation of the Copyright Act (Ottawa, October98 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
2002). Online: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ip/Section92eng.pdf, Preface,9 September 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
at i.99 WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996 [WCT].
106 Several provisions of the WCT, supra note 99, could, if implemented,100 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, December 20, 1996
further strengthen the rights of creators of works at the expense of rights[WPPT].
of users. This is particularly the case with the requirement in art. 11, to101 17 December 1992 (Ottawa: Supply & Services, 1993). legislate to provide ‘‘adequate legal protection and effective legal reme-
dies’’ against interference with technical measures of protection. TMP’s102 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
would include encryption and other digital barriers that would preventIncluding Trade in Counterfeit Goods, (1994) 25 I.I.C. 209.
a users’ access to a work unless a licence or other fee is paid. This would103 See WIPO copyright treaty, supra note 99 at art. 11 (the most controver-
make it impossible for users to freely browse works protected by TMP’ssial of these provisions requires contracting parties to take steps to
or to copy them, even within the bounds of fair dealing, without having‘‘provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against
to pay for access. For a thorough discussion of TMP’s and the issues theythe circumvention of effective technical measures that are used by
raise, see: Ian Kerr, Alana Maurushat and Christian S. Tacit, Technicalauthors in connection with the exercise of their rights . . . ’’).
Protection Measures, Part I & II (Ottawa: Canadian Heritage, 2003).104 The classic U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), is a good example of this point. The 107 Supra, note 3.
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